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Proof-Reading Aristotle’s Rhetoric*
ABSTRACT
This paper offers a new interpretation of the first chapter of Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric, and of Aristotle’s understanding of rhetoric throughout the 
treatise. I defend the view that, for Aristotle, rhetoric was a skill in 
offering the listener “proofs” (pisteis), that is: proper grounds for 
conviction. His arguments in the opening chapters of the treatise state 
and defend this controversial, epistemically-normative view against the 
rival views of Gorgias, Thrasymachus and and the rhetorical handbook 
writers, on the one hand, and against those of Plato, on the other. 
Aristotle defends his view on the basis that rhetoric is a skill in 
discharging an important role in the state – the role of helping citizens to 
good publicly-deliberated judgements. 
KEYWORDS: Aristotle, rhetoric, proof, Plato, Gorgias, Thrasymachus.
Introduction
This paper defends a particular understanding of Aristotle’s Rhetoric. The 
central claims are that in this work, Aristotle has a consistent view of rhetoric: 
as an expertise in producing ‘proofs’ (pisteis) – understood as “proper grounds 
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for conviction” – for the speaker’s audience, and that he first states and defends 
this view, and then sets out in detail the elements of rhetoric thus defined. This 
normative view of rhetoric derives, I claim, from Aristotle’s view that rhetoric 
was a skill in discharging an important role in the state – namely a role 
contributing towards good judgements in lawcourts and political assemblies. 
Aristotle is here seen as standing in opposition primarily to more mechanical, 
non-normative views of rhetoric, seen most clearly in Gorgias and 
Thrasymachus among his near-contemporaries, and characteristic of the 
handbooks on rhetoric circulating in Aristotle's day.1 But equally, he rejects 
more “high-minded” accounts of rhetoric, such as the suggestion in Plato’s 
Phaedrus that the speaker exercising rhetorical expertise must know the truth 
about his subject matter so as to be able to ensure that the conviction he brings 
about in listeners be true (or, if he chooses, false).
Defending the proposed interpretation involves rejecting several rival views of 
the Rhetoric. Aristotle’s view of rhetoric is not inconsistent.2 Nor is it 
1 Cf. Rhet 1.1, 1343a11-13, AUTHOR’S A 391-6, and below – section 1.
2 Many commentators have seen the treatise as setting out incompatible perspectives on 
rhetoric (typically finding an austere, more moralised perspective in 1.1, and a more 
permissive, pragmatic view elsewhere). Of these, some find in this a virtue, an exploration of
perspectives in tension (Cope 1867; Halliwell 1994; Schütrumpf 1994; Sprute 1994; differently
Grimaldi 1972; Kennedy 1985), others find incoherence Barnes 1995; Solmsen 1929; Wisse 
1989. In defending the view that throughout the Rhetoric, Aristotle holds a single consistent 
view, this article attempts to undermine one important part of the case against the unity of 
the treatise.
page 2 of 67
value-neutral, as some have thought.3 And yet, the normative element in his 
account of rhetoric is limited. Thus, on the interpretation defended here, we 
should not look to the Rhetoric – as some have – to provide an “ethics of 
rhetoric”, that is, an account of how rhetoric ought (virtuously) to be exercised.4 
Nevertheless, the Rhetoric does express Aristotle’s view of why rhetoric is an 
expertise valuable to the state and worth cultivating in individuals. Moreover, 
since his view is that rhetoric is a skill in providing proper grounds for 
conviction, the use of some manipulative speaking techniques (including some 
championed by, for example, Thrasymachus) will not count as exercising 
rhetoric at all.5
In sections 1-4, I set out from the text of the Rhetoric an account of Aristotle’s 
position, and how he sought to defend it. Sections 1 and 2 defend the proposed 
attribution to Aristotle of a consistent normative account of rhetoric, defined in 
terms of “proof”. Section 3 explores in more detail the understanding of this 
key term (Gk. pistis) as “proper grounds for conviction”. Section 4 further argues
that in Rhetoric 1.1 Aristotle’s understanding of rhetoric is not only asserted (and
3 Cf. in different ways, Carey 1996; Oates 1963; Rapp 2002a, 2002b, 2009, 2012, in line with 
Powell’s description of rhetoric as the “ancient art of spin” Powell 2005.
4 Pace e.g. Garver 1994; Irwin 1996; Wörner 1990.
5 The position canvassed here lies in the tradition of the ancient and Arab commentators (on 
whom cf. Black 1990) who saw the Rhetoricas concerned above all with the logic and 
epistemic credentials of persuasive speech (indeed, in the copies used by the Arab 
commentators, it seems often to have been bound in with the Organion in a single volume). 
Cf. Allen 2001, 2007; Burnyeat 1994 for contemporary interpreters taking this view.
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deployed against rival views), but defended on the basis of rhetoric’s role in the 
state. Section 5 explores the merits of Aristotle’s view over its rivals. 
Understanding rhetoric as an expertise in discharging an important role in 
public life arguably allows Aristotle to account for the value of rhetoric more 
convincingly than is possible on Thrasymachus’s and Gorgias’s view, but 
without being committed to the impossibly idealised picture of rhetoric set out 
in Plato’s Gorgias and Phaedrus.
1.
Aristotle, I claim, saw rhetoric as an expertise in producing “proofs” (pisteis), 
understood as proper grounds for conviction. Such a position is quite distinct 
from the views of Gorgias, Thrasymachus and the handbook writers on the one 
hand, and those put forward in Plato’s works on the other. Gorgias and 
Thrasymachus saw rhetoric as a collection of techniques for wielding power 
over an audience by speaking to them, specifically the power to produce 
conviction in one’s listeners, irrespective of whether they do well to be so 
convinced. Whereas Aristotle, I claim, saw rhetoric as an expertise in giving 
listeners good grounds for conviction (“proofs”, pisteis) – only techniques that 
met this criterion would count as rhetoric, in his view. Plato’s works convey the 
insistence that to count as a technê, rhetoric must have some account of how 
conviction is successfully brought about, and the suggestion that this is a matter
of understanding human psychology so as to know how different kinds of 
page 4 of 67
speeches will affect different kinds of souls. Aristotle, as we shall see, partly 
accepts this requirement, but draws not on a merely descriptive psychology of 
how conviction can be successfully produced, but on a normative psychology of 
how humans do well to be convinced. Accordingly, his theory sets out various 
kinds of “proof” (pistis) that rightly incline humans to be convinced. Aristotle 
disagrees with the Platonic view of the aim of rhetoric – in Plato, it was the 
production of virtue in the souls of listeners, for Aristotle, it is well-founded 
judgements in the listeners. Rhetoric, for Aristotle, aims at an epistemic good. 
Since Aristotle does not agree with the Platonic view that the expert orator 
should be in a position to control whether the audience’s convictions are true or 
false, he does not hold that the orator needs to know the truth about his subject 
matter. For Aristotle, the listeners’ judgements will be well-founded through 
being formed on the basis of good grounds for conviction (“proofs”, pisteis), and
providing these requires, in turn, not knowledge of the truth, but rather a grasp 
of plausible starting points for the listeners’ deliberations in the form of 
“reputable opinions” (endoxa) related to the subject at hand.
Rhetoric  1.1, 1354a11-16
Central to this sketch of Aristotle’s distinctive view of rhetoric is the claim that, 
for him, rhetoric was an expertise in providing proper grounds for conviction. I 
want to argue, on the basis of evidence from Rhetoric 1.1 and elsewhere, that 
this was indeed Aristotle’s view of rhetoric (and that this is a correct gloss of his 
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Greek term pistis), and explore how we should characterise his view of how 
rhetorical methods could provide such proper grounds for conviction. In the 
section 2 below, I will consider how such a view might be defended, starting 
from a consideration of how Aristotle actually does undertake to defend his 
view.
The bulk of Rhetoric 1.1 is taken up with a polemic by Aristotle against those 
who had written instruction handbooks for those with ambitions in public life, 
who needed to be able to succeed both in assembly debates, and in the 
courtroom. I’ve called them the “handbook writers”. They typically seem to 
have called their works “The Art (or Expertise) of Making Speeches” (technê 
logôn).6 Aristotle introduces his case against them by affirming (what Plato had 
once denied)7 that there is a genuine expertise of rhetoric. But as a result of this 
he must immediately insist that this does not constitute an endorsement of the 
kind of views and techniques peddled by the handbook writers. It’s as though 
he was saying, “Sure, Socrates was wrong in the Gorgias: there is an art of 
making speeches. But don’t think I’m talking about the kind of thing that you 
find in these handbooks labelled as an ‘Art of Making Speeches’.” In support, he
advances a number of arguments to show that the techniques of the handbook 
writers do not deserve to be called an expertise in rhetoric.
6 Cf. 1354a12
7 Gorg 462b8-c3, 465a2-5.
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The arguments  of 1354a11-18 can be summarised as follows.8 Since the 
expertise of rhetoric is exercised entirely in the production of “proofs”, or 
proper grounds for conviction, the handbook-writers’ lack of attention to the 
main way of providing such proofs (i.e. enthymemes: rhetorical arguments 
presenting relevant “considerations”), and their preoccupation with 
irrelevancies that can’t possibly contribute to proof, indicate that they have told 
us virtually nothing about the expertise in question.
Aristotle expresses his substantive view of rhetoric at 1354a13:
For it is only the proofs (πίστεις) that belong to the expertise (ἔντεχνον), 
other things are mere accessories (προσθῆκαι).
And for the arguments to work, the term “proofs” (πίστεις) here must be 
understood as meaning proper grounds for conviction – that is, he is expressing
the view that exercising the expertise of rhetoric constitutively involves 
conforming to some normative standards. He uses this view to adjudicate what 
things do and don’t constitute exercises of rhetoric, ruling in enthymemes, and 
ruling out the techniques with which the handbook writers were preoccupied.
If these arguments are sound, the best that can be said for the contribution of
8 A more detailed defence of this interpretation is offered in AUTHOR’S-B.
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these predecessors of Aristotle, the handbook writers, is that they have thought
lots about accessory features of rhetorical practice. What they have failed to do
is set out the essential features that explain success when the expert rhetorician
persuades by deploying his expertise.
However, the effectiveness of these arguments against their targets is subject to
an important qualification. Aristotle seems here to be merely asserting his own
position against the handbook writers’ views of rhetoric. If it is the views of
Gorgias,  Thrasymachus and their  followers  that  Aristotle  is  criticising,9 they
surely would simply reject his view of rhetoric. On their view, rhetoric’s power
is like that of a strong wrestler or a magic spell or a violent enemy: it produces
its result without needing to render that result in any sense proper. Whether
conviction  has  been  properly produced  is,  on  this  view,  an  entirely  separate
question  from  whether  conviction  has  been  produced  by  an  exercise  of
rhetorical  expertise.  At  this  stage  in  the  treatise,  Aristotle  has  offered  no
arguments  against  these  competing  views  and  in  favour  of  his  own.
Nevertheless,  if  his  view  can  be  supported  appropriately,  he  will  have  a
powerful  case  against  them.  So,  in  section  3  below,  I  will  try  to  show that
Aristotle has good reasons for accepting it.
2.
9 Cf. Solmsen 1938, Rapp 2002a 2.30-34, AUTHOR’S-A, AUTHOR’S-B.
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First,  however,  I  wish  both  to  address  an  important  objection  against  the
position canvassed here, and to explain how the view of rhetoric discerned in
these opening passages of the treatise is reflected in Aristotle’s later statements
characterising the nature, function and goal of rhetoric.
The nature of rhetoric and the sense of “πίστις” between 1.1 and the rest of the 
Rhetoric  .  
The opening arguments of  Rhetoric  1.1 seem to require the acceptance of the
following:
(RHET) Rhetoric, for Aristotle, is an expertise in producing πίστεις.
(PIST) “πίστις” means proper grounds for conviction.
However,  it  has  sometimes  been  doubted  that  Aristotle  adheres  to  these
consistently  through  the  Rhetoric.  In  particular,  it  is  often  claimed  that  the
meaning of “πίστις” changes between 1.1 and the rest of the treatise. 10 Against
this view, I will attempt to show that it is perfectly plausible to read the treatise
preserving throughout a consistent view of the nature of rhetoric and the sense
10 Cf. Primavesi 1987; Rapp 2002a; Solmsen 1929. A change in view or an inconsistency 
between 1.1 and the rest of the treatise has historically been suggested on a variety of 
grounds, of which this is one. It is sometimes linked with the supposed inconsistency about 
emotion-arousal addressed in AUTHOR’S-A. If these can be explained, the motivation for 
embarking upon the (hugely problematic) project of assigning different parts of the work to 
different periods of Aristotle’s thought is considerably undermined. The residual issue of 
whether the use of logical terms is consistent between the chapters cannot be addressed here.
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of “πίστις”.
This ought to come as no surprise, since there are a number of references back
from 1.2 to 1.1 (e.g.  1355b33, 1356a31),  suggesting that Aristotle at least saw
these two chapters as part of a continuous whole, and a number of references
back to book 1 from book 3 in passages that exhibit awareness of the contents of
both chapters.11
In  both  the  first  and  second chapters  of  the  Rhetoric,  Aristotle  characterises
rhetoric in terms of the  pisteis,  i.e. as proposed in RHET: that the techniques
belonging  to  the  expertise  have  to  do  with  the  pisteis (1.1:  1354a13,  b21,
1355a3-4; 1.2: 1355b35, 1356a20-33),12 and also as an expertise that consists in an
ability  “to  see  the  possibly  persuasive”  (1.1:  1355b10-17;  1.2:  1355b25-34).13
11 E.g  esp. 3.14, 1415b4-9 and 25-26. But note also how 3.1, 1403b6-13 recapitulates the analysis 
from 2.1 of technical pisteis into three kinds, and how within the same section b18-19 and 
1404a5-7 echo the emphasis in 1.1 on relevance and on using the facts to prove one’s case. 
The sections on taxis seem to reflect this same division (e.g. 3.17, 1418a12-21, a38-40 show 
awareness of the need for pathos and ethos proofs), but equally strongly echoes the 
sentiments of 1.1 on diabole, relevance and the centrality of proving your case with the facts 
(3.13, 1414a31-37, b7-8; 3.16 passim).
12 Notice that 1355b35’s analysis of pisteis follows immediately and naturally (there is no 
indication of a change of subject) from a definition of rhetoric itself, and that at 1356a20 
claims about the nature of the pisteis are presented as grounds for conclusions about rhetoric 
as a whole.
13 Notice that the distinction at b15-16 between what is really and what is apparently 
persuasive is incomprehensible in its context, on the view that “persuasive” (πιθανόν) 
means no more than ‘effective in producing conviction’. It must mean something like 
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Since,  on  any  understanding  of  what  pisteis are,  they  are  things  that  are
intended to produce a persuasive effect on the mind of the audience, so it is
perfectly  natural  to  move  from  talk  of  pisteis to  talk  of  “things  that  are
persuasive”.  Aristotle seems in both of the first two chapters to move easily
between these two ways of speaking about rhetoric’s core, as though they were
simply two closely related ways of speaking about the same thing, one focused
more on the content of the speech, the other focused more on its effect on the
audience. If so, Aristotle’s definition of rhetoric at 1355b25-6 as a “capacity to
see  the  possibly  persuasive”  is  not  a  denial  of  RHET,  but  simply  another
perspective on it.  And we can see both from the easy transition back to the
language of pisteis at b35, and from 1356a20-33, that he still thinks of rhetoric as
centrally about producing pisteis, i.e. that he is still committed to RHET.
Does the sense of πίστις change between 1.1 and the rest of the treatise?14 The
answer,  I  claim,  is  that  it  doesn’t,  and  that  Aristotle  uses  the  word  in
more-or-less  its  ordinary  Greek  sense  throughout,  sharpening  this  up
somewhat in one important passage (1355a3-18) to be discussed below. At no
‘persuasive by reason’ (cf. DA 3.3, 428a22-23; Rhet 1.2, 1356b28-30), such that rhetoric is an 
expertise in seeing what audiences will take to be reason-based grounds for persuasion 
(whether or not they are correct to do so).
14 Rapp 2002a, 34–5, argues convincingly against a range of different interpretations, and 
defends the view, adopted from Primavesi 1987,  that Aristotle in 1.1 uses πίστις 
quotationally (zitierend), and then gives the term a different sense in 1.2. My concern here is 
to reject this in favour of an ordinary Greek sense, though one somewhat different from the 
“unterminological sense” that Rapp rejects. 
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point, I contend, does he use this term in a technical sense, nor does he stipulate
a meaning for it.15
When, 13 lines into the treatise, Aristotle writes, “only the pisteis belong to the
expertise,” he clearly cannot be using this term in a way that presupposes his
own theory to be unveiled several pages later. He must be using the term in
some sense he can expect his readers to be familiar with already. One possibility
is  that  it  carries  its  ordinary,  everyday  sense.  But  another  is  the  ingenious
suggestion, defended by Primavesi and Rapp, that it is used allusively to mean
roughly, “the things that previous writers assigned to the section of the speech
they called ‘πίστεις’.”16 That “αἱ πίστεις” was a familiar term among teachers
of rhetoric for a particular part of a speech is corroborated somewhat by its
appearance  in  the  Rhetoric  itself  at  3.17,  1417b2117 as  a  way  of  introducing
discussion of the section of the speech devoted to proofs. The employment of
such a sense in 1.1, a part of the  Rhetoric explicitly concerned with previous
theorists  of  rhetoric  is  not  by  itself  implausible.  Indeed,  if  one  considers
15 The stipulation of meaning taking place at 1355b35-9 is of ἄτεχνα and ἔντεχνα. This 
distinction enables Aristotle to express his position more precisely, clarifying his looser 
assertion at 1354a13 (“the pisteis alone belong to the expertise”). None of this, however, 
indicates a change in the sense (as opposed to the reference) of πίστις. Indeed, the unqualified 
phrase “αἱ πίστεις” is used again shortly afterwards at 1356a21 where it clearly refers only 
to the technical pisteis. 
16 Primavesi 1987, 36-38; Rapp 2002a, 34-5.
17 Theodorus’ list of parts of the speech employs the slightly different terms πίστωσις and 
ἐπιπίστωσις (Plato Phaedr. 266e3-4).
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1354a13-14 in isolation, this sense may make for quite a plausible reading. But,
in the end, there are decisive objections. The first is that πίστις at a15 cannot be
read  in  this  way,  which  saddles  the  interpretation  with  an  awkward  and
unheralded shift of the term’s sense within 2 lines and between its first two uses
in the treatise. The second is that this interpretation turns a13-18 into a series of
loosely  connected  complaints,  rather  than  (as  canvassed  above)  a  carefully
constructed pair of closely-related  arguments to a single conclusion. The third
objection is that this suggestion is needlessly complicated and undermotivated,
since  the  ordinary  sense  of  πίστις  yields  a  perfectly  satisfactory,  indeed
superior,  understanding  not  only  of  this  passage  but  of  uses  of  the  term
elsewhere in the treatise. Indeed,  whatever other possibilities there may be for
the meaning of the term in 1.1, if it can be shown that the ordinary sense is
plausible both for this chapter and for the rest of the treatise, there must be a
strong presumption in its favour.
What, then, is the ordinary sense of πίστις? Consider the following passage of
Aristotle,  from a  context  with  no  particular  connection  to  the  discussion  of
rhetoric,  and  in  which  πίστις  is  clearly  not  part  of  a  specialist  technical
vocabulary.
The  knowledge  (γνῶσις) of  the  soul  admittedly  contributes  greatly  to  the
advance of truth in general, and, above all, to our understanding of Nature, for
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the soul is in some sense the principle of animal life. Our aim is to grasp and
understand (θεωρῆσαι καὶ γνῶναι), first its essential nature, and secondly
its properties; ...To attain any assured knowledge (τινα πίστιν) about the soul
is one of the most difficult things in the world. (De Anima 1.1, 402a4-11, transl.
J.A. Smith)
Aristotle’s  point  here  can  scarcely  be  that  it  is  supremely  difficult  to  find
anything to say about the soul that could be convincing to people, since people
then as now both had and were susceptible to acquiring all kinds of convictions
about  the  soul.  His  point  must  be  that  it  is  hard  to  find  things  that  merit
conviction, things that are a firm (in the sense of proper) basis for pursuing
knowledge  (γνῶσις).  Hence  πίστις  here  must  simply  mean something  that
merits conviction.
Similarly,  then,  in  Rhetoric  1.1,  Aristotle  can  rely  on  πίστις  having  this
normative sense quite independently of whether he is engaging dialectically
with a tradition of technical writing on rhetoric because this is simply part of
the ordinary meaning of the word, when it is used to refer to what produces
confidence. This can be seen in both philosophical and non-philosophical usage
from around the  same period.18 Understanding the  term in  this  way makes
18 One interesting philosophical example is from Parmenides fragment B1, 30, where a 
normative sense is extremely plausible. In Aristotle, see especially Top 100b19-21, 103b3-7; 
Soph. Elench. 165B27. In non-philosophical prose, the evidence from the orators is 
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sense of  the connection made frequently in  ancient  authors  between πίστις,
especially its use in such phrases as “πίστιν ἔχειν” (to be convincing) and the
cognate adjective πιστός (trustworthy).19 We argued above that the normative
sense  proposed  in  (PIST)  was  required  by  the  arguments  of  the  opening
chapter:  the  contemporary  usage  of  the  term  shows  this  to  be  simply  its
everyday meaning.
That this is the meaning of πίστις in 1.2 receives some additional support from
the following. Following the characterisation of rhetoric at the start of 1.2 as a
capacity to see the possibly persuasive in each thing (itself entirely consistent
with the view of rhetoric in 1.1, as we have shown), Aristotle draws attention to
a feature that makes it different from other expertises. That is that it has no
particular subject matter. In making this point, he observes that other expertises
are (i.e. make their possessor), in their own domain, “competent to teach and
persuade”  (διδασκαλικὴ  καὶ  πειστική,  1355b29),  whereas  the  implication  is
particularly relevant and instructive. Among uses of πίστις to refer to what produces 
conviction, I have yet to find a single instance incompatible with the proposed normative 
reading, and several that require it: cf. esp. Lysias 1.19.6, 12.10.1, 18.19.5, 19.32.2, 25.17.2; 
Isocrates Antidosis 125.5, Busiris 31.5, Helen 22.2, Paneg. 110.2, Phil. 91.8; Lycurgus in Leocr. 
79.4, 80.2, 127.12; Demosthenes 23.116.4, 23.117.2-7, 29.40.8, 30.26.1. In several cases, where it 
is qualified by an adjective (e.g. ἱκανή, μεγίστη, τοσαύτη), it is clear from the context that 
the aspect of the meaning of πίστις to which the qualifier draws attention is its indicating 
epistemic merit, not merely persuasive effectiveness. Demosthenes’  use of the phrase 
“τεκμήριον καὶ πίστις” (29.40.8, 30.26.1) similarly suggests that it is part of the sense of the 
term to indicate that what it refers to merits conviction.
19 Aristotle makes this connection explicitly in Top. 100b18-23.
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that rhetoric is, by virtue of its being a capacity to see the possibly persuasive,
competent to  persuade (πειστική) in  any given domain.  If  here all  that  was
meant by ‘competence to persuade’ were  de facto effectiveness in persuasion,
Aristotle’s point would be far from compelling – Plato’s Gorgias calls attention to
the fact that in large gatherings experts are less persuasive than non-experts
that have expertise in rhetoric.20 And only a page before this passage, Aristotle
himself  observes that  “before some people,  even if  we had the most precise
knowledge, it would not be easy to persuade them by using it in your speech”
(1355a24-5). Presumably the sense in which expertise brings persuasiveness is
precisely that it brings an ability to offer genuinely supporting justifications for
the  expert’s  claims.  Their  de  facto  persuasiveness  will  vary  considerably
depending on the circumstances of each case. Now if this is right, then even in
these opening sentences of 1.2, since Aristotle is suggesting that the rhetoric’s
persuasive  power  across  every  domain  has  an  important  similarity  to  the
persuasive power of each expertise in its own domain, we get a hint that this
persuasive  power  will  be  about  providing  proper  support  for  the  orator’s
claims, not merely devices that are de facto effective in getting people to believe
things.
After a brief discussion of rhetoric in terms of what is ‘persuasive’,  Aristotle
20 Gorgias 458e6-459c2. This is particularly relevant given that the juxtaposition of ‘teaching’ 
and ‘persuasion’ in connection with the expertises (technai) here is surely supposed to recall 
the discussion of Gorgias 453d7-454a5.
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reverts  to  talking  about  the  pisteis at  1355b35:  “proofs  can  be  divided  into
technical and non-technical proofs” (b35-6). We should notice two things. The
first is that this first use of “αἱ πίστεις” cannot mean the section of the speech
called ‘the proofs’, it must mean simply proofs; and since it picks up from the
talk of “the persuasive” (to pithanon) in the preceding paragraph, it cannot be a
way of referring to a section of the speech by specifying its contents. The second
is  that  this  sentence  seems to  presuppose some previous discussion of  “the
proofs”: and it seems most natural to suppose that it simply picks up on the
discussion of the proofs in chapter 1. If so, we should expect “αἱ πίστεις” to
mean the same in both places.
Another passage that suggests continuity in the meaning of the term between
1.1  and  1.2  is  1356a20-34.  The  passage  argues  that  since  the  pisteis are  of
such-and-such a kind, it turns out that rhetoric is an offshoot of dialectic and
politics, and a kind of part of dialectic. Notice firstly that this inference makes
far better sense if pisteis are central to rhetorical skill (our claim (RHET) above).
Secondly,  the  inference  from  the  nature  of  the  pisteis to  a  close  similarity
between  rhetoric  and  dialectic  recapitulates  what  was  said  in  chapter  1  (as
Aristotle himself observes at 1355a31-2), and strongly suggests that the meaning
of πίστις has not changed between the two chapters.
A final  passage to  consider  in this  connection is  1356b26-34.  In  this  section,
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‘persuasive’ (πιθανόν) is unselfconsciously paired with trustworthy (πιστόν)
(1356b29) and seems to be some kind of epistemic standing; and it is paired also
with ‘reputable’ (ἔνδοξον) (b34). It is seemingly simply assumed that the kind
of  persuasiveness  Aristotle  is  talking  about  will  derive  from  some  kind  of
trustworthiness or reputability.  This  is  perfectly natural  if,  as  I  am claiming,
Aristotle is committed throughout to rhetoric’s being an expertise in providing
proofs (RHET), understood as proper grounds for conviction (PIST).21
Understanding the term πίστις as meaning ‘proper grounds for conviction’, as
proposed in (PIST), is thus not only the ordinary meaning of the word in Greek,
it is also required by the argument of 1.1, and makes very good sense of its use
in 1.2 (indeed, the passages cited above can plausibly be taken to offer positive
support to this interpretation). This conclusion receives confirmation from book
3. It is clear that book 3 of the Rhetoric reaffirms both the classification of proofs
into three types from 1.2 (3.1, 1403b9-13; 3.17,  1418a12-17) and the emphasis
from 1.1 on the centrality of proof and using the facts to fight one’s case (3.1,
21 These may also explain Aristotle’s emphasis on πίστις and what might be plausibly seen as 
his suppression of the term πειθώ and cognates until well into the treatise (the first use in 
reference to rhetoric is at 1355a30). That the delay in the use of these terms is surprising and 
calls for explanation is suggested by the very close association between rhetoric and 
cognates of πειθώ both in Aristotle, and in the preceding Platonic treatments of rhetoric (e.g.
EN 3.3, 1112b14; Plato, Gorgias 452e-453a; Phaedrus 270b8, 271b4-5.). The suggestion is that, 
although Aristotle would not deny that rhetoric was concerned with persuading, he initially 
uses πίστις to the exclusion of πειθώ in order to make clear that his view of rhetoric centred 
on the provision of proofs, not simply on successful persuasion.
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1403b18-20,  1404a5-7;  3.13,  1414a30-36).  And  in  this  context,  it  is  clear  that
πίστις  means,  as  in  1.1,  rhetorical  arguments that  provide  some  kind  of
demonstration of the conclusion for which they are offered as support (3.13,
1414a30-36; 3.17, 1417b21-34). For example, at 1414a30-36, Aristotle takes it as
obvious that the orator’s task of ‘demonstrating’ (ἀποδεῖξαι) his conclusion will
be discharged by providing ‘proofs’ (πίστεις). All of this lends support to the
proposal (PIST) that throughout the treatise, by ‘πίστις’ Aristotle means proper
grounds for conviction.22
Aristotle’s overall characterisation of rhetoric
I now wish to show that in a number of key passages where Aristotle expresses
his understanding of what rhetoric is, its function, goals and methods, the view
he expresses is consistent with, and in many cases confirms the understanding
of rhetoric and the nature of the pisteis I am attributing to Aristotle.
Aristotle’s first characterisation of the nature of rhetoric comes in the first lines
of the treatise.
Rhetoric is a counterpart to dialectic. For both are concerned with things that
22 One might additionally note that where, both in and outside the Rhetoric, πίστις is used to 
refer to the state of being convinced, this is closely associated by Aristotle with its being a 
response to reason and argument, e.g. Rhet 1.1, 1355a5-6, De Anima 3.3, 428a17-23.
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are such as to be, in a way, common to everyone to get to know, and that relate
to no specific body of knowledge. This explains why everyone also, in a way,
possesses something of both. For, to an extent, everyone engages in criticising
and maintaining an argument and in defending and accusing people. Now in
the  general  population,  some  do  these  things  at  random,  others  because  of
practice do them from ability. Because both of these are possible, it is clear that
there would also be a way of doing these things methodically. For where success
is achieved by some because of practice and by others from their own ability, it is
possible to study the explanation for this: and just such a thing all would agree
is the function of an expertise (τέχνης). (1354a1-11)
Here, he emphasises that rhetoric, in common with other  technai, explains its
possessor’s  non-accidental,  method-based,  success  in  achieving  some  goal.
Rhetoric’s sphere of operation is not precisely specified, but that it is pursued in
settings of public deliberation such as law-courts is gestured at in the reference
to “defending and accusing people” (a5-6).
The nature of rhetoric is further indicated in the emphatic alignment of rhetoric 
with dialectic (a1), and it is clear that the basis for this similarity is the centrality
of arguments to both.23 The very next sentence in the text has already been 
discussed at length.
23 Cf. Allen 2007.
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These days, those who put together ‘Arts of Speaking’ have provided us with 
scarcely a part of it. For it is only the proofs (πίστεις) that belong to the art, 
other things are mere accessories. (a11-14)
It confirms that Aristotle sees rhetoric as an expertise to which the proofs are
central, and this suggests that it is precisely the role of reasoning and arguments
that he sees as the central component both of dialectic and of this closely-related
expertise  used  in  “defending  and  accusing”.  Indeed,  this  impression  is
specifically  confirmed  in  the  next  chapter,  when  he  describes  rhetoric  and
dialectic as “certain capacities for providing arguments” (1356a33-34), and uses
the  importance  of  reasoning  (τὸ  συλλογίσασθαι,  1356a22)  to  rhetoric  as  a
reason for thinking that rhetoric is not merely a kind of offshoot of dialectic
(οἷον παραφθές τι, a25), but a kind of part of dialectic and similar to it (μόριόν
τι τῆς διαλεκτικῆς καὶ ὁμοί[ωμ]α, a30-31).
It is in this context that we should read Aristotle’s explicit statement at the start
of 1.2 on the nature of rhetoric.
Let rhetoric be an ability in connection with each thing to see what is possibly
persuasive. For this is the function (ἔργον) of no other expertise.(1355b26-28)
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Aristotle had just specified the “function” (ἔργον) of rhetoric in very similar
terms (1355b10-11), and although these formulations by themselves leave open
what could count as “persuasive”, it is clear from the context just described that
he has in mind an ability to see the possibilities for persuasive arguments.
Accordingly, Aristotle’s view about the goal of rhetoric (strictly, the goal rhetoric
enables its possessor to secure)24 is that it is to secure some particular judgement
by  offering  proof  (πίστις)  or  demonstration  (ἀπόδειξις)  of  it  (1354a26-28,
b30-31). What type of judgement it is the orator’s goal to secure will depend on
the type of speechmaking in which he is engaged (1.3, 1358a36-1359a6). Thus,
forensic speakers are aiming to convince their listeners that an action was just or
unjust, deliberative speakers that some course of action is beneficial or harmful,
and epideictic  speakers  that  something or  someone was fine or  base.  When
Aristotle touches in passing on the goal of rhetoric at the start of each of books 2
and 3, he simply says that it is “for the sake of a judgement” (ἕνεκα κρίσεώς,
1377b20-21),  or  “with  a  view  to  [the  audience’s]  conviction”  (πρὸς  δόξαν,
1404a1).  One final passage to consider with regard to the goal of rhetoric  is
Aristotle’s introduction in book 3 to his treatment of ‘arrangement’ (τάξις), i.e.
24 Rapp 2009 organises his discussion of the goals of rhetoric in terms of a modern distinction 
between “internal” and “external” goals. This doesn’t match Aristotle’s use of terminology, 
of course. All of Aristotle’s remarks about the “goal” (τέλος) and “function” (ἔργον) of 
rhetoric, and hence the discussion here, are concerned with the “internal” goals of rhetoric. 
Aristotle’s views on the “external” goals of rhetoric are expressed in terms of how it is 
“useful” (χρήσιμος), and emerge in passages where he touches on the role of public 
speakers in the state. These topics are discussed below in section 3.
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of the parts of a speech.
There are two parts of a speech. For it is necessary both to say what the issue is
on which one will speak, and to demonstrate it (ἀποδεῖξαι). That is why it is
impossible having said something not to demonstrate it, or to demonstrate it
without  having  first  said  it.  For  the  one  who  demonstrates  demonstrates
something,  and the one who introduces something introduces it  in order to
demonstrate  it.  And  of  these,  the  one  is  a  statement  and  the  other  a  proof
(πίστις),  just  the  same  as  if  one  had  distinguished  these  as  thesis  and
demonstration. (3.13, 1414a30-34)
Aristotle is, of course, not literally specifying that a properly-constructed speech
have only two parts (he discusses six parts in the section of book 3 introduced
by this paragraph). He is rather indicating, presumably, that these are the two
essential parts that a speech is bound to contain, given the nature and purpose
of  speechmaking.  But  if  so,  this  confirms  that  here  too  Aristotle’s  view  of
rhetoric  makes  proof (πίστις)  central  to  the expertise,  and characterises that
proof as “demonstration”, a characterisation that at the very least suggests the
provision of good grounds for the speaker’s claim.
The  exact  significance  of  Aristotle’s  use  of  terms  such  as  “demonstration”
(ἀπόδειξις) in characterising rhetorical proof is the subject of the next section.
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For  now,  my  concern  is  to  have  shown  that  there  are  good  grounds  for
supposing that Aristotle’s commitment to a view of rhetoric in which it is an
expertise in offering proper grounds for conviction is not only required by the
initial  arguments  of  the  Rhetoric  1.1,  but  also  makes  good sense  of  how he
characterises the expertise throughout the treatise.25
3.
Aristotle’s Theory of Proof (1355a3-18)
To claim that rhetoric, for Aristotle, was a skill in producing pisteis, and that we
should understand  these  to  be  “proper  grounds  for  conviction”  is  to  invite
questions about what standards Aristotle thought something had to meet in
order to count as “pistis”. This section addresses these questions.
A theory of  pistis:   what constitutes proper grounds for conviction?
Aristotle, as we have seen, clearly thinks that material irrelevant to some issue
25 Arguably, such a view gains support from attention to the things Aristotle lists as 
non-technical pisteis (i.e. proofs that require no technical skill to develop, but are simply 
available ready to be used by the speaker), in his discussion of these at 1355b35-39. He does 
not include things of dubious evidential value, such as the family or race of the speakers, 
even though these might help bring about the desired verdict. He does include things that 
are good reasons (at least in the view of Aristotle and his contemporaries) in favour of some 
particular verdict: written laws, witness statements, written agreements, evidence obtained 
under torture (cf.  Mirhady 1996, Thür 2005, Rhet 1.15, 1376b31-1377a7d and Rhet. ad Alex. 16)
and statements made under oath.
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cannot qualify as proper grounds for conviction of the orator’s proposed view
of that issue. Irrelevance is an impropriety that excludes material from being a
possible pistis. On the other hand, Aristotle seems to allow that there are things
that  would  count  as  exercises  of  rhetorical  skill  despite  being  sufficiently
objectionable that they should not be done.26 Thus, not every way of lacking
propriety rules something out as a pistis.  So, what should we think Aristotle
supposes is required for something to count as a  pistis? The answer I propose
might be roughly summarised thus: an orator presents listeners with proper
grounds for conviction of his conclusion just if what he presents to them is – by
their lights – good reason for adopting the conclusion he is recommending.27 A
more precise formulation is as follows.
Proposed Characterisation of Aristotelian  Pistis:
1. A pistis consists of premises28 acceptable to the audience that stand
in such a relation to the conclusion for which they are offered as a
pistis that if one accepts (and persists in accepting) the premises, it
26  cf. 1355a29-31: Rhetorical expertise involves being able to argue both sides of the case, even 
where actually to do this shouldn’t be done because it would be to persuade people of things
that are inferior or base “οὐ γὰρ δεῖ τὰ φαῦλα πείθειν” (a31). Cf. also 1355b2-7: rhetoric can 
be used wrongly and cause great harm.
27  This rough summary is intended only as an approximation to the view I am recommending.
28 Since both logos-proofs (1359a6-10, 26-9; 1377b16-20) and pathos-proofs (1378a26-9) involve 
premises, it seems reasonable to infer that êthos-proofs also do.
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would be an exercise of  good judgement to be inclined towards
accepting  also  that  conclusion  because  of  those  premises.  (cf.
1355a3-14: pisteis require skill in dialectic) 
2. A pistis is comprised of things that are reputable, and it is a device
by which they confer good standing29 on something else, namely
the conclusion. (cf. 1355a4f. Pistis is a demonstration of a kind) 
3. A pistis aims at inclining the listener to accept the conclusion30 as a
result of sensitivity to the reputability of of the premises and the
relation in which they stand to the conclusion. (cf. 1355a4f. Pistis is
a demonstration of a kind) 
My main concern in this characterisation is to state more precisely what it is
about a pistis that makes it proper grounds for conviction. Accordingly, in what
29 It is unclear what the correct Aristotelian terminology would be for the epistemic good 
standing of a conclusion of a sound argument from reputable premises (and we do well to 
note that not only rhetorical arguments but systematic enquiries in ethics, for example, 
involve starting from premises that are reputable rather than known). Still, it is clear from 
both the Rhetoric and the Posterior Analytics that Aristotle’s view is that rhetorical arguments 
are structurally similar to the (ideal) case of scientific demonstration, where the epistemic 
merits of the premises of a sound demonstrative argument serve to deliver conclusions that 
are in sufficiently good epistemic standing to count as understanding (ἐπιστήμη). I am 
grateful to Terry Irwin for highlighting this issue.
30 It is in this sense that Aristotle can allow that the proximate goal of rhetoric is to persuade. 
cf. EN 3.3, 1112b14, and below n.58.
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follows, I will be mainly concerned with parts 1 and 2.
In  some key  passages  in  Rhetoric  1.1,  Aristotle  emphasises  that the  orator’s
exercise of his craft should not corrupt the listener, indeed it should assist him
in making good judgements aimed at the truth.31 On the above formulation, the
orator’s presentation of  pisteis does this by helping the listener to undertake a
process of inference that has two important features. One is that the premises
are ones that the are reputable. The other is that the process of inference itself
proceeds correctly such that, given appropriate premises, it serves to increase
the good standing of the conclusion.
Rhetorical, Dialectical Expertise and the Nature of  Pisteis  : 1355a3-18.
The following passage confirms this proposal.
 
Since  it  is  plain  that  the  expert  method  is  concerned  with  the  proofs  [Gk.
pisteis], and proof is demonstration of a kind [Gk.  apodeixis tis] (for we are
convinced most of all whenever we think a thing has been demonstrated), and a
rhetorical  demonstration is an enthymeme, and this is  pretty much the most
important  of  the  proofs,  and  the  enthymeme  is  reasoning  of  a  kind  [Gk.
sullogismos tis], and it is the job of dialectic (either dialectic generally, or one
31 Cf. 1354a24-31, and below section 3. Note that such a view undeniably has significant 
normative content, but is considerably less high-minded than some competing views of 
rhetoric attributed to Aristotle.
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of its parts) to consider alike all reasoning, it is clear that the one who is best
able to discern this – from what and how a piece of reasoning comes about –
would also be best skilled in enthymemes, provided he also grasped the features
of  the  enthymeme  and  how  it  is  different  from  cases  of  logical  reasoning.
(1355a3-14)
This passage presents many difficulties, not all of which can be discussed here.
What  I  hope  to  show  is  that,  on  any  plausible  understanding  of  its
argumentative structure and key terms, a number of points emerge about the
nature of rhetorical pisteis.
Firstly, Aristotle is concerned to show that it is experts in dialectic who are best
placed  to  possess  an  expertise  in  rhetoric.  This  is  clearly  the  conclusion
emphatically  announced  at  a10-14.32 (Compare  also  the  treatise’s  opening
slogan,  “Rhetoric is  the counterpart  to  dialectic!” 1354a1.)  Hence the section
serves as a kind of sales pitch for his own teaching, with Aristotle suggesting
that one should learn rhetoric from someone like him whose expertise makes
32 This is confirmed by the clear echoes at a14f. of Plato Phaedrus 260-273, especially 273d2-6. 
Aristotle’s care at 1355a14-18 (discussed in ch. 5 below) to insist against Plato’s Socrates that 
the expert orator need not know the truth about his subject matter is best explained by 
supposing that his main point in a3-14 was that expertise in dialectic enables expertise in 
rhetoric. Since Socrates had said something rather similar, Aristotle might easily have been 
misunderstood as endorsing the Phaedrus position, hence the need for clarification.  Cf. 
Phaedrus 270a-c and 271a-272b in the light of 266b-d, esp. d1-4.
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him well placed to furnish the necessary foundation in dialectic. The basis for
his argument is the nature of rhetoric (as concerned with providing pisteis) and
hence  the  nature  of  the  pisteis.  The  crucial  point  for  our  purposes  is  that
Aristotle’s argument here – however we trace it out in detail – is based upon the
nature  of  pisteis (a3-5).  A  pistis  is  of  such  a  kind,  and  the  most  important
(component?) of the  pisteis, enthymeme, is of such a kind that it is experts in
dialectic  that  are  best  placed  to  master  them.  What  is  it  about  expertise  in
dialectic that helps with enthymemes and pisteis? Aristotle explicitly says at a11
that  it  is  a  matter  of  being able  to  discern “from what  and how a piece of
reasoning comes about” (ἐκ τίνων καὶ πῶς γίνεται συλλογισμός). So,  pisteis
are such that  their  successful  production is  a  matter of  knowing something
about how reasoning works, and something about the selection of materials for
reasoning.33 My contention is  that  the crucial  aspect  of  understanding “how
reasoning  comes  about”  is  understanding  the  inferential  relations  that  may
obtain between the elements of a piece of reasoning: particularly, understanding
how these may stand to one another as premises to conclusion such that if one
accepts (and persists in accepting) the premises, one is urged towards accepting
also  the  conclusion.  This  feature  is  precisely  what  is  needed  for  skill  in
producing enthymemes and pisteis generally, i.e. for being good at rhetoric. And
it  is  a  central  skill  of  dialectic.  The  other  aspect  of  dialectic  that  is  a  key
33 Thus, the meaning of this phrase here matches that of the almost identical phrase at An. Pr. 
1.4, 25b26-27.
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requirement  for  rhetorical  expertise  is  an  ability  to  select  premises  for  an
argument to the desired conclusion – an ability “to discern ...  from what ...  a
piece of reasoning comes about”. Obviously part of an ability to discern the
right premises is an ability to see their inferential relations to the conclusion.
But if this were all that was intended by this phrase, it would make the “from
what”  and  the  “how”  of  a11  almost  identical.  It  is  more  likely  that  what
Aristotle  has  additionally  (and  perhaps  principally)  in  mind  here  is  the
dialectician’s  ability  to  identify  premises  that  not  only  stand  in  the  right
inferential relations to the conclusion, but are acceptable to the listener. These two
features  of  dialectical  skill  mentioned  specifically  by  Aristotle  here  help  to
illuminate the nature of the pisteis with which the passage starts. They confirm
what  was  proposed  in  our  characterisation  of  pistis set  out  above.  A  pistis
consists of premises that are acceptable to the listener and that stand in the right
kind of relations to the judgement for which they are offered as a pistis.
A second feature that sheds light on what a pistis is the claim that a pistis is “a
demonstration of a kind”, or “some sort of demonstration” (a4-5).34 For on any
plausible  interpretation  of  this  claim,35 a  demonstration  (even  one  that  is
strictly-speaking  defective  in  certain  ways)  will  be  a  device  by  which  the
34  cf. Burnyeat 1994 13-30. For the present point, nothing depends on the interpretation of tis.
35 The original sense of apodeixis to mean simply ‘show’, ‘make public’ or ‘reveal’ (e.g. 
Herodotus 1.1; cf. Barnes 1969 78) is not a plausible candidate here. However stringent, 
technical or otherwise the sense is in this passage, it is clearly a case of “showing that”.  
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reputability of the premises confers good standing on the conclusion. It is for
this reason that demonstration is a suitable instrument for teaching, learning
and persuasion (An Post. 1.1, 71a1-2, a9-11; cf.  Rhetoric 1.2, 1355b26-35). This is
an important addition to what we have already seen. For in certain kinds of
dialectical reasoning, the practitioner’s purpose can be merely to undermine a
key thesis or set of premises introduced or accepted by their interlocutor, by
showing  that  the  premises  entailed  an  unacceptable  conclusion,  were
inconsistent  with  each  other,  or  were  inconsistent  with  the  key  thesis.36
Reasoning  can  have  this  limited  function,  even  when  it  uses  acceptable
premises. But demonstration aims at something more. Demonstration aims at
the  acceptance  of  the  conclusion.  So,  in  claiming that  pistis is  some kind of
demonstration,  Aristotle  is  saying  that  it  is  comprised  of  things  that  are
reputable,  and  that  it  is  a  device  by  which  they  confer  good  standing  on
something else, namely the conclusion.
Thirdly,  it  seems  that  we  can  say  something  stronger  about  the  connection
between pistis and demonstration. We see this in the way Aristotle supports his
claim that pistis is apodeixis tis (a4-5). The supporting reason given is that we are
convinced (pisteuomen, a5) most of all when we take it that something has been
demonstrated.  On  a  very  literal  interpretation,  Aristotle  has  a  rather  poor
argument here. He would be making an inductive generalisation from the cases
36 Cf. e.g. Top. 8.4-5, 159a16-37; Soph. El. 2, 165a38-b11, and, for discussion, Allen 2007.
page 31 of 67
of  greatest  or  best  pistis (pisteuomen malista,  a5)  to  a  conclusion about  pistis
generally. On a more plausible reading, however, Aristotle’s argument is about
what  is  essential  to  pistis.  What  he  seems to  have in  mind is  that  the most
successful  cases  of  pistis illuminate  what  it  is  about  a  pistis that  makes  it
successful or unsuccessful, i.e. what makes it a good example of pistis. The view
thus illuminated is that a pistis is successful to the extent that the conclusion is
demonstrated, and this shows us that every pistis must involve some degree of
demonstrative success on pain of being so bad as a pistis that it is not a pistis at
all.37 38 The suggestion  is  not simply that being a demonstration is one thing
among many that can make a proof a good proof, but that what it is to be a good
proof is  (at least  in part)  a matter of its  credentials  as  a demonstration.  This
would constitute a good justification for a conclusion about the nature of proof
itself: that it is demonstration of some kind (a5). What might Aristotle intend by
37 Aristotle is not here affirming that every case of pistis is a defective case of demonstration, 
“only a sort of apodeixis, ... not as it were your full-blooded specimen, not something from 
which you can expect everything that you would normally expect from an apodeixis ...” 
Burnyeat 1994 13. Otherwise, cases of the kind he cites apparently as the most successful 
kind of pistis at a5-6 would risk not only failing to attain that accolade, but failing to be cases 
of pistis at all, making nonsense of the argument. The difficulty is avoided if we take the 
force of Aristotle’s assertion here to be not the negative claim that pistis is no more than a 
defective demonstration, but rather the positive claim that pistis is demonstration of at least 
that relaxed, less-than-full-blooded kind.
38 Cf. LSJ v.sub ‘tis’ I.A. This interpretation thus accommodates the merits of the alienans 
reading by allowing that the kinds of demonstration over which this expression ranges 
might include the less-than-full-blooded kinds of demonstration that are central to the 
alienans reading: defective demonstration perhaps, but demonstration in some sense 
nonetheless. Cf. Burnyeat 1994 13-39. 
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such an assertion?  On the most obvious conjecture,39 two aspects are central:
one relates to the premises, and the other concerns the way the demonstration
proceeds from them to the conclusion.40 If this is right, then – as in our proposed
characterisation of Aristotelian  pistis – Aristotle is committed to the view that
the  more  reputable  the  premises  are  to  the  listeners,  and  the  tighter  the
inferential relation between premises and conclusion, the better the pistis, and to
the view that any proof must involve exhibiting these features to at least some
degree.
Together these features of  Aristotle’s  argument at 1355a3-14 suggest  that  the
understanding of  pistis proposed above does indeed capture Aristotle’s view.
They  also  make  clearer  the  sense  in  which  pistis is  ‘proper  grounds  for
conviction’, and suggest that “proof” – while not perfect – has some merit as an
English translation of “pistis”.
We see this account of proper grounds for conviction reflected in what Aristotle
says elsewhere in the Rhetoric about the kinds of premises needed for rhetorical
39 Clearly this is not the point at which to reach for his technical account of demonstration from
the Posterior Analytics. What is appealed to here is an everyday understanding of what it is to
have something demonstrated. cf. Burnyeat 1994 esp. 13-14.
40 These do, in fact, have their more stringent counterparts in Aristotle’s technical account in 
the Posterior Analytics (71b20-24): the self-explanatory character of the axioms, and the 
necessity with which what is demonstrated follows from them.
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argument. Premises need to be persuasive or reputable41 to the kind of people
being  addressed  (1356b33-4),  and  this  is  a  matter  of  their  either  being
intrinsically plausible to them (pithanon kai piston, b29) or being shown to follow
from things that are intrinsically plausible (b29f.). This, typically, is a matter of
the  premises  being  recognisable  to  listeners  as  the  kind  of  thing  they  are
accustomed to using in sound deliberation (1356b37f.). Seemingly, for premises
to be reputable and for them to be agreed are distinct, but both can contribute to
making an argument persuasive (1357a12-13).  Such premises may consist  in
likelihoods of various kinds (1357a34-b25) or of examples with a similarity to
the case in question (1357a7-21). Interestingly, although premises for rhetorical
proofs could be intrinsically plausible or inferred from things that are, Aristotle
deems it necessary to clarify that this does not require the orator to go back to
first principles in the relevant subject matter. To do so would either confuse the
listener  with  an  argument  too  long  to  follow  (1357a3-4,  a10-12,  a16-23),  or
would in fact involve a departure from exercising  rhetorical expertise into the
exercise of an expertise in some particular subject area (1358a2-26). Premises
should be such that listeners are disposed to regard them as reputable, either by
their  being  intrinsically  plausible  to  them  already,  or  because  they  can  be
quickly inferred from things that are.  Finally,  there is the obvious point that
41 Endoxon at 1356b34 appears to be used as simply a synonym for pithanon, used immediately 
before this at b28. It seems to be given a slightly more precise sense at 1357a12-13 where 
having premises that are ‘agreed’ seems to be distinct from and correlative to having 
premises that are ‘reputable’ (ex endoxôn).
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Aristotle’s  phrases  “to  (endechomenon)  pithanon”  –  the  (possibly)  persuasive
(1355b15f.,  b26,  b33f.;  1356a12f.,  a20,  b28-9;  1403b19)  and  “ta  hyparchonta
pithana” – the existing persuasive things (1355b10-11) – typically refer simply to
features of the circumstances surrounding the forensic case or political proposal
with which the orator is concerned. On our proposed account of pistis these are
those features (or combinations of features) that the listeners are disposed to
regard as true or likely (and hence reputable to believe), and which stand (and
can be presented as standing) in the relevant kind of relation to the speaker’s
conclusion. In this way, Aristotle can insist  that “the things referred to” (τὰ
ὑποκείμενα πράγματα) by the speakers have an influence on the effectiveness
of their case. Things that are “true” and “better” will generally yield the better
argued  and  more  persuasive  side  of  a  debate  (1355a36-38).  Indeed,  he
summarises his treatment of the pisteis as a treatment of “what things give the
facts  themselves  (αὐτὰ  τὰ  πράγματα)  their  persuasiveness”  (1403b19),  and
insists that it is right for the speaker to ‘fight using the facts themselves’ (1404a6;
cf. also 1416a37).
There is thus considerable textual support for the characterisation of Aristotle’s
understanding  of  pistis set  out  above.  However,  this  view  faces  some
difficulties, and it will be important to show how these can be addressed. These
relate firstly to Aristotle’s inclusion of “apparent enthymemes” among proofs
that proceed through the argument itself, and secondly to his recommendation
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that the orator use premises the speaker knows or believes to be untrue.
Apparent Enthymemes
It is clear that in 1.1, 1.2, 2.24 and elsewhere Aristotle recognises that genuine
“proofs” sometimes proceed through inferences whose propriety as inferences
is merely apparent (hereafter, “fallacies”), and that mastery of these is part of
the  expertise  of  rhetoric.42 He  devotes  a  whole  chapter  to  these  “apparent
enthymemes”  at  2.24.  Their  inclusion  seems  to  cast  doubt  on  the  above
characterisation of Aristotelian pistis, since it requires a relationship between the
premises  and  conclusion  such  that  the  premises  provide  genuine (and  not
merely apparent) support to the conclusion.
Of  course,  there  are  a  number  of  reasons  why one might  suppose  that  the
expert orator ought to know about plausible fallacies. This might be in order to
recognise and undermine them when an opposing speaker makes use of them.43
Equally, if the abilities and knowledge that constitute the expertise of rhetoric
involve  the  ability  to  distinguish  among plausible  inferences  the  good ones
42 Cf. “the apparently persuasive” 1.1, 1355b15-16; “apparent demonstration (δεικνύναι)” 1.2, 
1356a4, a36; “the apparently <true>” 1.2, 1356a20; “apparent enthymeme” 1.2, 1356a35-b4, 
2.24, 1400b34-37. That these belong to the expertise of rhetoric is explicit at 1355b15-16, and 
follows from the fact that proofs by apparent enthymeme are one kind of proof through the 
argument itself. That Aristotle is recommending their use seems clear from 2.24, “useful” 
(1401a8), “one should do whichever is the more useful” (a26), unless we are somehow to 
understand these recommendations conditionally.
43 Cf. what Aristotle says about knowing how to argue both ways on an issue: 1.1, 1355a29-33.
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from the bad, they will inevitably involve some knowledge of and ability to
deploy the latter.44
Still,  these do not explain how fallacies could constitute ‘proper grounds for
conviction’, which I argued above is the meaning of pistis. This is best explained
by  paying  attention  to  what  is  meant  by  “apparently  persuasive”
(φαινόμενον  ...  πιθανόν,  1355a15-16)  and  “apparent  enthymeme”
(φαινόμενον ἐνθύμημα, 1356b3-4, 1400b35-36). It was noted above that since
not all things persuasive or all enthymemes are merely apparent in this way,
there must be something that the merely-apparent cases appear to be. What is
this? The most obvious answer is that they appear to be good inferences, i.e.
they  are  taken to  be so  by the  audience.  We might  next  note  that  Aristotle
doesn’t seem to recognise “apparent” cases of every type of proof. It  is only
proofs through the argument itself (1356a1-4) that include apparent as well as
real “demonstrations” (δεικνύναι, a4). The most natural thing to think here is
that  when  listeners  are  attending  to  “the  argument  itself”  and  mistakenly
believe the inference from premises to conclusion is good, then in adopting the
conclusion, they do something that would be an exercise of good judgement,
were their beliefs true. The false belief in the correctness of the inference functions
as a premise in an argument that is then properly inferred from premises some
of which are false.  Thus although some set of premises p does not entail  or
44 Cf. Metaph. Θ.2, 1046a36-b7.
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support q, if the subject mistakenly believes that p  q, the  inference from both→
p and p  q to q is correct. The fault in the overall argument lies in the false→
belief  in  the  truth  of  p   q.  But  this  simply  makes  the  use  of  apparent→
enthymemes  unexceptional  within  Aristotle’s  view  of  rhetoric,  according  to
which expert speakers get audiences to move from premises that are reputable
to them, but may not be true, to conclusions that those premises, if true, would
support.
Accordingly, there will be a certain kind of use of rhetoric that makes extensive
use  of  fallacies  mistakenly believed by audiences  to  be  good inferences.  As
Aristotle explains, this is to rhetoric what sophistical arguments are to dialectic.
Additionally,  [it  is  clear]  that  the  same  expertise  covers  seeing  both  the
persuasive  and  the  apparently  persuasive,  just  like  the  syllogism  and  the
apparent syllogism in the case of dialectic too. For the nature of sophistic lies not
in the capability deployed, but in how one chooses to deploy it. Except that here
one will be a “rhetorician” on the basis of their knowledge, and another on the
basis of their choice. Whereas there one is a “sophist” on the basis of their choice,
and a “dialectician” on the basis not of their choice but of their capability. (1.1,
1355b15-21)
Aristotle’s  point  here  is  about  the  way  in  which  the  term  ῥήτωρ  (literally:
orator, here translated “rhetorician”) does double duty as a term for the person
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possessing the expertise (τέχνη) of rhetoric, and for the person who chooses to
deploy this expertise with a particular aim. This is in contrast to dialectic where
there  are  separate  terms  for  the  person  with  the  expertise  (“dialectician”,
διαλεκτικός) and the person with the distinctively competitive aim (“sophist”,
σοφιστής). But in both cases, the competitive and less scrupulous manner of
deployment  is  nonetheless  a  deployment  of  the  same  expertise  (dialectic,
rhetoric).  So,  just  as  “sophistic” is  a  deployment  of  dialectical  expertise that
makes extensive use of merely apparent syllogisms (cf. Soph. El. 164a20-165b11),
so there is a kind of deployment of rhetoric that will similarly make extensive
use  of  merely  apparent  enthymemes  that  are,  as  Aristotle  puts  it,  only
“apparently persuasive”.
One might worry, then, about a kind of manipulation where a speaker might
take  advantage  of  audience  beliefs  (whether  about  the  correctness  of  an
inference, or about any other matter) that he  knows to be false, to get them to
assent to his desired conclusion. Can such a technique still count as providing
proper grounds for conviction, and thus count as an exercise of the expertise of
rhetoric? This is the subject of the second difficulty facing the proposed account
of Aristotelian pistis.
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The proposed characterisation of  pistis  and the use of premises not believed by 
the speaker
It is striking that the proposed account of proof offered above does not exclude
the use by the speaker of premises that he  himself does not take to be true or
reputable. All that is required is that proofs consist of material that the listeners
are  disposed  to  regard  as  reputable,  and  that  if  true  are  good grounds  for
judging  the  conclusion  true.  It  might  be  worried  that  this  leaves  open  the
possibility that besides any good purposes the expertise of rhetoric might serve,
it  was equally  well  suited to  perverting the  course of  justice  or  leading the
assembly astray by appealing to popular beliefs that the speaker knows to be
misleading  misconceptions.  The  worry  is  justified,  but  only  up  to  a  point.
Aristotle is optimistic about the extent to which popular views track the truth
(1355a14-18), and is happy to allow that even if the fallibility of popular beliefs
allow  the  unscrupulous  practitioner  opportunities  for  leading  the  citizens
astray,  that  same  set  of  beliefs  will  generally  be  affording  more and  better
opportunities to the other side of the debate to persuade the citizens of what is
true and right (1355b36-8).
However worrying or otherwise this is, it certainly seems to be Aristotle’s view.
There is a much-discussed example at  Rhetoric  1.9, 1367b22-27 of the kind of
unscrupulous  practice  in  question,  an example  which is  sometimes  cited  as
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showing that Aristotle’s view of rhetoric had no normative content.45 In fact this
passage  creates  a  difficulty  only  for  more  idealised  accounts  of  rhetorical
expertise sometimes attributed to Aristotle,46 and fits nicely with the view of
pistis offered here.
Since praise is made on the basis of actions, and what is distinctive of the good
man is what is done from choice, you are to try to show that he acts from choice,
and it is useful that he be taken to have done these actions on many occasions.
This is why coincidences and things that happen by chance are to be taken as if
they  were  by  choice,  for  if  many  similar  things  are  produced,  they  will  be
thought a sign of virtue and choice. (1.9, 1367b22-27)
This is probably the best example of such underhand practice. It is difficult to
deny that Aristotle is endorsing the practices described in this passage: his use
of the gerundive ‘to be taken’ (lêpteon) seems clearly a prescription to the orator
to proceed in this way.47 But does this violate Aristotle’s earlier restrictions on
45 e.g. Schütrumpf 1994 123-7. His list of “morally questionable tricks” includes also 2.24 
(discussed below) and 2.21, 1395a8-10, where Aristotle’s point is surely just that it can 
sometimes be important to state something more crudely or sweepingly than is really the 
case, presumably in order to convey the force of the point. Note that even here, Aristotle is 
careful to confine such a strategy to the opening or closing summary, not the proofs section.
46  e.g. Irwin 1996 esp. 142-46: Irwin even cites this passage at 163 but seems not to see the 
difficulty for his position; Wörner 1990.
47 A gerundive that is undeniably prescriptive occurs 3 lines earlier ‘you are to try’ (peirateon), 
and there are myriad other examples throughout the Rhetoric. 
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what can count as a pistis and hence on what counts as an exercise of rhetorical
expertise? It is possible to read this instruction charitably simply as advice to
the  orator  not  to  be  too  fussy  about  whether  each  action  in  a  series  of
apparently similar actions was by chance or by choice. Or it may be that the
advice concerns cases where it is hard to know the exact motives for a series of
similar actions: Aristotle advises the orator to allocate the ‘benefit of the doubt’
in the way that suits his case. Still, let us adopt a less charitable reading for the
sake of testing our proposed account of pistis, since this passage has sometimes
been  read  so.48 To  take  an  example,  I  praise  Helen  as  being  compassionate
(having the virtue of compassion), and cite her numerous trips to the hospital
visiting the sick – despite the fact that I know that in several of these cases the
fact  that  the  people  she  visited  were  sick  and  in  hospital  was  a  matter  of
coincidence – she was in fact collecting debts from several of them.
Aristotle here describes this kind of case as a sign-argument (1367b27 sêmeion),49
where the sign in question is in fact a sign for two related things:
Sign: that Helen went often to the hospital and visited the sick.
Signified 1: that Helen makes fully-fledged prohaireseis to visit the sick in
hospital,  i.e.  that  she  chooses  these  actions  because  they  are  cases  of
visiting  the  sick  in  hospital,  and  chooses  them  from  a
48 e.g. as “direct instructions to lie” (Schütrumpf 1994 125).
49 For a full treatment of this theme, cf. Allen 2001.
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character-disposition.
Signified 2: that Helen is compassionate
For this argument to be a  pistis, and to be the kind of thing that counts as an
exercise  of  the  expertise  of  rhetoric,  it  must  on  our  account  satisfy  two
requirements. The first is that the ‘persuasive feature’ (to pithanon) in this case be
presented as itself something that the listener will find reputable, the second is
that it be something that, if true, makes it an exercise of good judgement to
suppose that Helen is compassionate. In this case, absent any special reason to
disbelieve it, the listeners are likely to regard the sign, that Helen went often to
the  hospital  and  visited  the  sick,  as  believable  simply  on  the  basis  of  the
speaker’s testimony. The problem is supposed to arise in the way this fact is
related  to  the  beliefs  that  Helen  is  compassionate  and  that  she  makes
prohaireseis to visit  the sick in hospital.  For simplicity,  we will  refer only the
former of these. The difficulty is that there is a deception here: the implication is
that Helen’s coincidental visits were caused by her compassion, when in fact
they  were  not,  and  the  speaker  knows  they  were  not.50 That  Aristotle
countenances the deceptive use of rhetoric is taken to show that he does not
think that exercising rhetoric involves meeting some normative standards. But
this is simply a mistake. Aristotle’s suggestion in this passage does not (even on
the least charitable reading) violate the specific normative conditions proposed
50 Such deception seems objectionable by Aristotle’s lights as well as our own: NE 2.7, 
1108a19-23; 4.7, 1127a17-26.
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above for something’s being a pistis and hence being an exercise of rhetoric. This
is because the fact that Helen has visited the sick in hospital many times simply
is good  grounds  for  supposing  that  she  is  compassionate.  The  move  from
believing the sign to believing the signified is wholly proper, even though there
is no guaranteed connection at all between sign and signified, and certainly the
sign does not guarantee the truth of what it is appropriately taken to signify. It
is  an  exercise  of  good judgement  on  the  listeners’ part  if  they  judge Helen
compassionate  on  the  basis  of  this  sign.  Aristotle’s  language  here  is
non-committal about whether this is genuine case of a sign (sêmeion) – he says
that many similar things “will be believed to be” (doxei) a sign of virtue and
choice. This might imply that he thinks this is not a genuine case of a sign, since
the  coincidences  were  not  caused  by  virtue  or  choice.  But  equally  he  may
simply be showing that what is important in deploying this kind of proof is
what  the listener  thinks.  Either  way,  this  example meets  the key criteria  for
pistis set out above, and specifically that what the audience believes would, if
true, make it an exercise of good judgement to believe the speaker’s proposed
conclusion.  Accordingly, it  is  entirely  compatible  with  producing  genuinely
rhetorical  proofs  that  these  use  material  that  the  speaker  does  not  himself
believe.51
51 This holds whether the speaker thereby behaves badly or not. Note that the use of premises 
one believes to be flawed need not always be deceptive or insincere. An atheist might 
persuade an audience of Christians by appeal to the authority of Christ or the Bible, without 
himself recognise their authority.
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4.
I have recommended attributing to Aristotle a normative view of rhetoric very
different from that of Thrasymachus, Gorgias and the handbook writers who
followed them. We will see below that his view also has the resources to resist
the Platonic demand that the expert orator know the truth about his subject
matter. Nevertheless, it is the handbook writers that are the focus of attention in
the  early  arguments  of  the  Rhetoric.  And it  is  to  these that  I  now return to
uncover Aristotle’s  attempts  not merely to assert  but  to  justify his  proposed
view of rhetoric.
.
Aristotle’s Justification of his Proof-Centred view of Rhetoric
Aristotle’s  proof-centred understanding of  rhetoric  is  expressed succinctly at
1354a13-14, in a claim that plays a pivotal role in his opening arguments against
the handbook writers.
Proper grounds of conviction are the only thing that belong to the expertise of
rhetoric.
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That is to say, that the techniques or methods in which the expertise consists are
methods of identifying proper grounds for conviction and providing them to
listeners.
As was noted, this claim is initially unsupported. We would perhaps expect to
find that Aristotle returns to offer a defence of this view of rhetoric. I propose
that this is exactly what he does. One indication to that effect is that about a
page  later,  Aristotle  himself  says,  “Since  it  is  evident  that  the  method that
belongs to the expertise of rhetoric is concerned with proofs ...” (1355a3-4). It is
not plausible to suppose that this claim was “evident” all along, so it must be
that something in the intervening page or so constituted a basis on which it is
now evident.
I’m going to sketch how I think he defends his view, and then return to the text
of  Rhetoric  1, where I think we find Aristotle offering an array of arguments
against  the handbook writers  which appeal  to  just  the kind of  picture I  am
about to sketch.
A sketch of Aristotle’s view of the relationship between rhetorical expertise and
the proper functioning of the state.
States – plausibly all states, but certainly the Greek  poleis of Aristotle’s day –
need orators (public speakers). This is because in order to function well it is
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necessary for citizens to confer, deliberate and come to decisions. This includes
deciding on laws and state policy, and coming to verdicts in the lawcourts. For
citizens to make judgements about the merits of courses of action, or of each
side’s case in a law suit, the case for each of these has to be made. 
Rhetoric, then, is an expertise in discharging public speaking roles in the
state – specifically, it is an expertise in helping citizens to arrive at good
publicly-deliberated judgements in line with the speaker's proposal,52 by
making  the  case  one  way  or  another  in  relation  to  some  proposed
verdict,53 so  that  a  judgement  can  be  made  as  to  its  merits  (often  in
comparison with the merits of some rival proposal).
Note that when Aristotle talks of an expertise (Gk.  technê), what he means is
something like what we call ‘know-how’, that is to say that having an expertise
52 Reflection on what the technê of rhetoric serves to produce is invited right at the start of the 
Rhetoric, when Aristotle says that, “as all would agree”, an expertise should account for 
non-accidental success (epitunchanousin 1354a9). But success in what? What exactly is the 
product whose successful production will be accounted for by this expertise? Aristotle’s 
answer seems to be that it is good publicly-deliberated judgements by citizens in line with 
the speaker's proposal. Aristotle eventually identifies rhetoric's goal explicitly at 1358b1-2, 
with the whole of 1.3 devoted to explaining how this works in each kind of rhetoric. More 
briefly, at 2.1, 1377b20-21, he says, “rhetoric is for the sake of a judgement (heneka kriseôs).” 
Cf. also 1.2, 1357a1-2 where rhetoric’s function is discharged only in relation to things that 
are the objects of deliberation.
53 “Demonstrating the matter, that it is or is not the case, that it happened or did not happen.” 
1354a27-28.
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explains your non-accidental success at something (as indeed Aristotle reminds
us in the first 10 lines of the treatise). So, having an expertise in cobblery is what
explains your non-accidental success in making or repairing shoes. Accordingly,
the  techniques  involved  in  the  expertise  of  cobblery  will  be  predominantly
concerned  with  working  leather.  What,  then,  does  rhetoric  enable  you  to
succeed in doing? The formulation offered above provides, I believe, Aristotle’s
answer. Rhetoric enables you to succeed non-accidentally as a public advisor,
helping  citizens  towards  certain  good  publicly-deliberated  judgements.
Accordingly, the techniques involved in rhetoric will be concerned solely with
proper  grounds  for  conviction  in  relation  to  whatever  the  subject  under
consideration is.
Before examining how this picture emerges from Aristotle’s arguments against
the handbook-writers, I should comment briefly on two concerns that might be
raised about this strategy.
Firstly,  one  might  worry  that  justifying  the  view  that  rhetoric  is  solely
concerned with providing proper grounds for conviction by appeal to a view of
rhetoric as an expertise in discharging this kind of public role simply pushes the
justificatory question further back. Why should we think that this is the right
account of what rhetoric helps its possessor to accomplish? One might answer
this worry on Aristotle’s behalf by insisting that, although there may be many
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other  competing  conceptions  of  “rhetoric”  and  its  goals,  it  is  rhetoric  thus
defined that is the skill most worth cultivating in oneself and others, and it is for
the exercise of this skill that it is worth making institutional provision within
the state. In short, he is offering an account of the kind of rhetoric that is worth
having.
Secondly, one might worry that,  since all  that is  required of the premises of
pisteis is that they be acceptable to listeners, there is nothing to guarantee that
good inferences from such premises will improve the judgements of listeners,
and  hence  nothing  to  guarantee  that  rhetoric  will  benefit  the  state’s  public
deliberations. This will seemingly hold only where the premises are true.54 One
might answer this worry by insisting that deliberating using good inferences
rather than bad is already to have deliberated better, regardless of the merits of
the  premises.  No  doubt  Aristotle  would have agreed with such  a  response,
though there seems no trace of such a view in the pages of the Rhetoric. But such
a response is only applicable where the relevant comparison is between good
inferences  and bad from the premises  in  question.  Whereas  the  comparison
relevant to whether the state benefits from the exercise of Aristotelian rhetoric is
between making good inferences from premises acceptable to the citizens, and
making no such inferences. Here it is doubtful that it is better to form further –
possibly false – beliefs than to form no additional beliefs. Aristotle’s conviction
54 I am grateful to COLLEAGUES3 for helpful discussion of this issue.
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of the beneficial  effects  of  rhetoric  seems to rest  instead upon an optimistic
assessment  of  the  contingent  tendencies  of  humans  to  believe  the  truth.  In
Aristotle’s  account  (1355a21-b7)  of  why  rhetoric  is  useful  or  beneficial
(chrêsimos), much of the space in the text is devoted to how rhetoric enables the
judgements of the judges to reflect the natural superiority of what is true and
good  (a21-24).  The  latter  are  “generally  easier  to  prove  and  more  likely  to
convince” (a38). A few lines earlier he asserted, “human beings themselves are
naturally  inclined  towards  the  truth  and  usually  do  attain  the  truth.”
(1355a15-17)  Rhetoric,  then,  involves  helping  citizens  to  reason  well  from
premises  that  are,  in  Aristotle’s  view,  likely  to  be  true.55 Indeed,  they  are
particularly likely to be true if they are acceptable to many people, not just to
some given individual.56 And if reasoning well from existing beliefs tends to
make one’s overall  set of beliefs more coherent,  this is likely to improve the
proportion of true to false beliefs in the set in the case where the beliefs in the
55 It is true that in the Rhetoric as a whole, Aristotle’s view of the orator’s typical audience 
includes disdainful and elitist sentiments, as well as the optimistic and “democratic” 
sentiments expressed in the passages referred to here. However, there is nothing in 
Aristotle’s more disdainful views that undermines the key claim here, that for Aristotle, 
premises that are commonly held to be reputable will tend to be true. Cf. 1354b8-11 
(listeners’ private likes and dislikes cloud their judgement); 1355a24-29 (some listeners can’t 
be persuaded “from the most precise knowledge”, but must be persuaded through the 
“commonplaces”); 1357a3-4, 11-12 (listeners are “simple” and cannot cope with long trains 
of reasoning); 1403b34-5, 1404a7-8, 1415b4-8 (because of the depravity of the listeners, 
attention must be given to delivery, to attracting listeners’ attention, and to various other 
crowd-pleasing devices).
56 Cf. 1356b33-34.
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initial set are mostly true.
I return now to the task of showing that the view sketched above does indeed
match Aristotle’s view of rhetoric’s purpose, and that these are the grounds on
which he seeks to justify his account of what rhetorical expertise is an expertise
in. Throughout the section 1354a18-1355a3, we see Aristotle appeal to just such
a picture of the role and value of rhetoric in the state. That is to say that this is a
view he both endorses himself and can presuppose in his readers.
In  the  argument  appealing  to  the  rules  of  well-governed  places  like  the
Areopagus (1354a18-21),57 it is taken to be obvious that a well-functioning state
should not eliminate the possibility of exercising genuine rhetorical expertise: it
would  thereby  forego  vital  contributions  to  public  deliberation.  And  it  is
equally obvious, on this view, that it is appropriate to have safeguards against
the misuse of opportunities for public speaking in the state, where the purpose
of those opportunities is the improvement of publicly-deliberated judgements
through the exercise of genuine rhetoric. Since it is clear that these rules and
safeguards would rule out the handbook writers’ techniques, those cannot have
been techniques of rhetoric.
Similarly,  the carpenter’s ruler simile (1354a24-6) and the argument from the
57 The argument is discussed in more detail in AUTHOR’S-B.
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speaker’s role (1354a26-31) both presuppose and appeal to the assumption that
the success of the speaker in his role requires the preservation or promotion of
the success of the judges in theirs. In cricket, the fact that the batsman ought not
to play deliveries wide outside the off-stump, and that he would be playing
poorly if he did, does not mean that it is not part of the bowler’s business to
bowl  deliveries  there.  The  difference  between  this  example  and  Aristotle’s
orator is precisely that in cricket the bowler aims at the batsman’s failure in his
role, whereas Aristotle’s orator aims at (or at least he must ensure) the judges’
success. This becomes a natural thing to accept only if you suppose, as I am
proposing Aristotle did, that the proper functioning of the judge in deliberation
and judgement is central to the role and purpose of the speaker.58 
So, my suggestion is that in these arguments we see Aristotle partly setting out
and partly presupposing a view of rhetoric and its place in the state in the light
of which it  makes sense to claim that the techniques of rhetoric  are entirely
concerned with proofs or “proper grounds for conviction”.
58 Conceivably, one might read a26-28 and a28-31 as two more-or-less independent reasons for 
thinking that the state is right to ban irrelevant speaking. Even on this suggestion, the first of 
these reasons still seems to require the kind of view of rhetoric I am suggesting. But the 
second might not: that the juror has an important role in the state, and that this might be 
threatened by speakers addressing topics other than the issue at hand (specifically the 
legality and severity of the issue), is already good reason for the state to take action to 
prevent this threat, specifically by prohibiting irrelevant speaking. No view of the speaker’s 
role need be presupposed. Still, this does not strike me as a preferable reading of the 
passage.
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This  suggests  a  way of  reading the  conclusion  of  this  passage  of  argument
(1354b16-22)  that  is  more  integrated  than  those  suggested  by  previous
commentators,59 and which helps to make sense of how Aristotle has achieved
by 1355a2, not just a devastating criticism of the handbook writers, but (as he
claims) a justification of his own position. He claims at 1355a3f. that it is now
obvious  that  the  expertise  of  rhetoric  is  concerned  with  providing  proper
grounds for conviction. The extent to which he has argued for this conclusion
we  will  consider  below.  But  we  propose  here  a  reading  of  1354b16-22  that
shows how the passage of argumentation concerned with the proper role of
judges contributes to his basis for the claim at 1355a3ff..
If this is correct, then it is obvious that it is an expertise in irrelevance that is the
thing discussed by those who give definitions of other matters, such as what the
introduction or narrative should contain or each of the other parts of the speech
(since in them they busy themselves with nothing except how to put the judge
into a certain condition) but set out nothing about the proofs that belong to the
expertise,  that  is  to  say  the  means  of  becoming  good  at  enthymemes.
59 Possible exceptions: Kassel's text has parentheses around b19-20 (“since in them .. 
condition”), which suggests that he reads the following clause (“but set out ...”) as 
coordinate with “give definitions of other matters ...” (b17f.), following Jebb 1909 ad loc., cf. 
Kassel 1971, 1976, both ad loc.. This is consistent with – thought does not require – the 
interpretation I am proposing here. 
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(1354b16-22)
Exactly  what  is  claimed  and  on  what  basis  in  this  passage  has  sadly  not
received  much  scholarly  attention.60 This  is  surely  not  because  it  is  all
luminously  clear.  In  looking at  this  passage,  and how it  is  connected to  its
surrounding  context,  I  hope  to  canvass  the  merits  of  the  following  claim.
Aristotle here concludes not just that the handbook writers’ techniques were for
irrelevant speaking, but also that he was correct in his previous claim61 that the
handbook writers have told us next to nothing about the proper constituents of
rhetorical  expertise.  He has now given us grounds to suppose what  he had
previously  merely  asserted,  namely  that  rhetoric  is  concerned  with  giving
proofs, and turns out to consist, at its core, in a skill in enthymemes.
The argument, I suggest, runs as follows:
60 The passage is cited twice in the Symposium Aristotelicum volume (Furley and Nehamas 
1994), but on both occasions this is little more than a passing mention. Cope 1877 has 
nothing on this except a misunderstanding mentioned below. Neither Grimaldi 1980 nor 
Rapp 2002a offers help on these points.
61 This claim is, in my view, announced at 1354a11-13, argued for between that passage and the
passage currently under discussion, 1354b16-22, at which point his demolition of their work 
is complete. They had set out an expertise not in rhetoric but in irrelevance. There is then a 
brief passage about how all this sheds light on their (otherwise puzzling) preference for 
forensic over deliberative speaking. Some of these conclusions then re-appear in the 
summary passage 1355a19-20, though it is disappointing for my interpretation that what I 
claim is the main conclusion of the chapter up to this point (that the handbook-writers have 
told us little about rhetoric) is not reaffirmed here in this summary.
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Once it is established (b16)
a. what the role of the orator is (a role in discharging which rhetoric is the
relevant expertise), and,
b. in particular, on what kinds of subject it is appropriate for the speaker to
exercise his rhetorical expertise by speaking,
the following become obvious (b16)
1. that  it  is  an  expertise  in  irrelevance  that  the  handbook-writers  have
offered (b16-17)
• in  particular:  the  clarification  of  appropriate  topics  on  which  to
deploy  rhetoric  highlights  the  irrelevance  of  the  things  that  most
concerned the handbook-writers (b17-20); and
2. that (therefore)  they have told us virtually nothing about the genuine
constituents of rhetorical expertise (b20-21),
• which in fact is a matter of becoming good at enthymemes (b21-22).
On this way of understanding the argument, I suggest Aristotle underlines the
progress made not just in negative polemic, but, more positively, in justifying
the  central  tenet  of  his  own view  of  rhetoric.  His  claim that  rhetoric  is  an
expertise in giving proofs, a claim that played such a pivotal role in Aristotle’s
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opening  arguments  (and  for  which  no  supporting  argument  was  initially
offered), has now been given much more substantial support since its original
assertion at 1354a13.
Aristotle  previously  had  merely  asserted  that  rhetoric  was  an  expertise  in
providing  proof.  He has  now shown that  if  you  accept  that  rhetoric  is  the
expertise  that  enables  a  person  to  be  successful  as  an  advisor  in  public
deliberations, you should agree that its exercise consists in providing proofs.
During  the  course  of  these  arguments,  he  has  appealed  to  a  number  of
assumptions  that  support  the  view  that  rhetoric  is  indeed  an  expertise  in
discharging this advisory role within the state. One such assumption is that the
orator’s success itself  requires the good deliberation of the judge. Another is
that  orators  should  properly  be  barred  from  irrelevant  speaking.  And  yet
another is that orators should be confined to the facts of the case at hand, that is,
to the aspects on which they have a distinctive advisory contribution to make.
Once we attend to some of the contours of rhetoric’s role in the state, it becomes
clear  that  it  is  bound  to  consist  in  producing  proofs,  that  producing
enthymemes  will  be  a  characteristic  exercise  of  rhetoric,  and  that  skills  for
irrelevant speaking contribute are not part of the expertise at all.
5.
Comparing Aristotle, Plato, and Gorgias and Thrasymachus on rhetoric.
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It should now be clear how Aristotle positions himself against the handbook
writers, whom I take to represent in Aristotle’s day the tradition of Gorgias and
Thrasymachus.62 The  difference  between  his  account  of  what  rhetorical
expertise consists in and theirs comes down to a difference in their views of the
nature and value of rhetoric itself. The handbook writers saw rhetoric as a skill
for exercising power over others, whose value consisted principally in its value
to  its  possessor.  By  contrast,  Aristotle  took  a  wider  view,  showing  how  the
expertise possessed by speakers is valued not only by those speakers but by
others too. His view involves seeing rhetoric as an expertise for whose exercise
states make provision – states invite speeches by protagonists in lawsuits, and
by  proponents  and  opponents  of  political  policies.  States  encourage
speechmaking, and value the development of skill in this area, because this is
seen  as  contributing  to  the  quality  of  civic  judgements.  Audiences  listen  to
speakers similarly with the aim of improving their judgements on the issues
addressed. Even Aristotle’s view of rhetoric's value to its possessor derives in
part  from  what  is  valuable  about  the  judgements  subsequently  formed  by
listeners. Rhetoric is valuable to the speaker because it enables them to gain the
verdict they desire, and in such a way as to constitute an  endorsement of their
own position, because judges deliberating soundly adopted their recommended
62 Cf. Solmsen 1938, Rapp 2002a 2.30-34, AUTHOR’S-A 391-6, AUTHOR’S-B 111-12, pace 
Solmsen 1929 215.
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point of view for the reasons they offered. In this way, Aristotle’s view accounts
in a unified way for the value of rhetoric to the speaker, to the listener, and to
the state as a whole.
The follower of Thrasymachus or Gorgias may still insist that the expertise they
describe is entitled to be called “rhetoric” or “the art of speaking”. Aristotle’s
position  against  them  can  be  understood  either  as  the  claim  that  what  he
describes better captures the concept of the public speaker’s expertise, or as the
claim  that,  even  if  there  are  several  different  skills  that  might  be  called
“rhetoric”, the expertise he describes is the most valuable for the state to foster,
for listeners to value in speakers, and for speakers themselves to develop and
exercise.
Aristotle’s  arguments,  especially  in  the  opening  chapter  of  the  Rhetoric,  are
deployed  principally  against  the  handbook  writers.  But  in  a  number  of
passages, he indicates his awareness of rival Platonic views on rhetoric.
Within  Plato’s  Gorgias  (462b-c),  Socrates  denied  that  rhetoric  was  a  technê
because it offered no principled account of why and how its techniques worked.
Even within that dialogue, that seems to function as an objection to what was
proposed as a technê by Gorgias and others, rather than ruling out entirely the
possibility  of  a  technê of  speechmaking.  The  Phaedrus  takes  up  the  task  of
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exploring what such a technê might be like. Accordingly, by the time Aristotle is
writing the Rhetoric, the view that there was a technê of rhetoric does not seem to
have  been  very  controversial.  Thus,  at  the  start  of  the  Rhetoric,  Aristotle
concludes in a mere 11 lines that there must be a technê of rhetoric in order to
explain the consistent non-accidental success of  some orators.
Also in the Gorgias, the requirement is expressed that rhetoric have a good aim.
Otherwise, rhetoric will either turn out to be something shameful (464e2-465a2)
or possibly may fail thereby to be a  technê at all (501b3-5, 504d-e). Again, this
seems a good objection to Gorgias’s rhetoric, seen as a kind of power to achieve
whatever seems expedient to its possessor, whether or not this is actually good.
The better alternative that Socrates has in mind is that rhetoric aim at justice
and self-control in the souls of the citizens (504d-e). The Aristotelian view I have
argued  for  above  gives  rhetoric  a  good  goal,  but  it  is  different  from  that
envisaged by Socrates.  It  is  rather the goal of well-grounded judgements by
citizens  in  contexts  such  as  law-courts  and  assemblies.  Aristotle,  not
implausibly, supposes that generally the available evidence will provide better
grounds for judgements that are true or correct than for judgements that are
false or wrong.63 Hence, rhetoric as Aristotle understands it aims at something
good  because  it  aims  to  affect  the  judgements  of  listeners  in  ways  that
systematically incline them towards judgements that are true and good. This
63 Rhetoric 1.1, 1355a15-17, a21-b7.
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makes  perfect  sense  if  rhetoric  aims  at  well-founded  civic  judgement,  and
exercising  rhetoric  is  a  matter  of  providing  proofs  based  on  available
evidentially-relevant facts.
In the Phaedrus, Socrates argues that any genuine expertise in rhetoric requires
for its exercise the knowledge of the truth about one’s subject matter. This may
be motivated simply by a worry that otherwise persuasive argument will risk
simply transmitting the flaws in the audience’s existing beliefs onto any new
convictions they are persuaded to form. But this requirement seems more likely
to be motivated by the idea that rhetoric should put its possessor in control of
whether the audience’s beliefs turned out true or false.64 Aristotle does not seem
to recognise the requirement that the expert orator know the truth. Indeed, two
passages in the Rhetoric can be plausibly interpreted as a rejection of precisely
64 The requirement is advocated at 261d-262c and recapitulated briefly at 273d-e, in response to
the proposal attributed to Tisias that the orator need know not the truth about his subject but
what will seem likely to his listeners. The requirement cannot be that unless he knows the 
truth, an orator will be unable to persuade someone to accept some given claim, since even 
within the dialogue the example of Socrates persuading Phaedrus that he should get a horse 
for fighting enemies (260b-d) shows that this is possible despite the ignorance of both parties
about what a horse was. Of the various interpretative options available for explaining what 
motivates the requirement, the view that the orator needs to know the truth in order to be in 
control of whether the listener’s views turn out true or false is suggested by 262b5-c3. There, 
as elsewhere, it is emphasised that the orator should be able to deceive (if he chooses) but 
escape deception himself, on pain of not having a genuine technê at all. This suggests that 
rhetoric is here seen as a skill that puts its possessor in control of the whether their listeners’ 
beliefs (and their own) turn out true or false.
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this Platonic requirement.
At 1355a10-14, Aristotle concludes that it is the person skilled in dialectic who
will be best able to master the skills of rhetoric:
[given the preceding argument] it is clear that it is the person who is best able to
see how and from what elements reasoning proceeds, that would also be best at
enthymemes, provided they grasp additionally the features of enthymemes and
how they differ from logical exercises in reasoning.65
He supports this with the following argument.
For what is true and what is similar to the truth belong to the same capacity to
see,  and  at  the  same  time  human  beings  themselves  are  naturally  inclined
towards the truth and usually do attain the truth. That is why being good at
hunting down what is reputable66 is a mark of the same kind of person as being
good at hunting down the truth. (1355a14-18)
This seems to be a way of saying that the ability of the philosopher to find the
truth (by making inferences from starting points) and the ability of people to
form judgements based on what is likely (by making inferences from plausible
65 The final phrase, “logikous sullogismous” is hard to translate, but seems to mean pieces of 
reasoning where the focus is on the validity of the argument, such as in pure dialectic (or 
peirastic). Cf. An. Post. 93a15 (the only other use of this phrase in Aristotle). The differences 
Aristotle has in mind in this passage may include that enthymemes aim at the adoption of 
their conclusion, not merely at showing what follows from what, and that in enthymemes 
the truth of the premises may recommend the conclusion without necessitating it.
66 The wording here subverts the pejorative use of στοχαστικός at Gorgias 463a7, where 
Socrates claims that rhetoric is an untechnical knack of guessing at what will please people.
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starting  points)  are  the  very  same ability.  And both  are  essentially  reliable,
insofar as the starting materials – the plausible views (endoxa) – are grounded in
humans’ general ability to hit the truth for the most part,  and insofar as the
inferences proceed correctly. So, the ability of the true rhetorician and the ability
of the philosopher are the very same thing – not in the way Plato thought in the
Phaedrus, by requiring that both philosopher and rhetorician possess knowledge
of their subject matter, and indeed of a whole lot else, but rather by requiring
only plausible starting points from both, plus good inferences from these (of the
kind dialectical expertise would endorse).
If  this  is  a  correct  interpretation,  then  the  argument  serves  to  justify  the
conclusion that  preceded it  by showing that  (leaving aside the “additional”
things mentioned at a12-14) the understanding of dialectic is  sufficient for an
understanding of rhetoric  (or,  strictly,  of enthymemes).  The argument shows
specifically that there is no additional requirement that the rhetorician know the
truth  about  an  issue  to  be  able  to  exercise  genuine  rhetorical  expertise  in
producing enthymematic arguments for some particular view on that issue.
There  is  a  further  argument  at  1355a24-29  for  why  rhetoric  as  Aristotle
understands it  is  more useful  than persuasion based on knowledge of  one’s
subject matter.
[Rhetoric is useful because ...] Additionally, before some people, it would not be
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not easy, even if we had the most exact knowledge, to be persuasive using it. For
knowledge-based argument belongs to teaching, and this is impossible, rather we
must develop our proofs and arguments via the commonplaces, as we said also
in the Topics about encounters with the many.
It is plausible to suppose that Aristotle is here arguing against the view found in
Plato’s Phaedrus (261d-262c, 273d-e), discussed above, that exercising rhetorical
expertise  requires  knowledge  of  one’s  subject  matter.  If the  Platonic  view
Aristotle opposes here is that in order to persuade using any argument that
proceeded by similarities one must know the truth of one’s subject matter,  the
argument seems apposite. With some people, a similarity to the truth about the
matter in question will not make something persuasive. Rather, with them, one
needs  to  start  from  very  general  notions  on  which  everyone  agrees  (the
“commonplaces” - ta koina). Thus, knowledge of the truth does not help, and is
less  useful  in such contexts  than what Aristotle takes rhetoric  principally to
involve,  namely the elements  of  dialectic  –  the abilities  to  identify plausible
starting points, and to reason well from these. However, it was suggested above
that the Platonic requirement that the expert orator know the truth was so that
the expertise would put them in control of whether the convictions they secured
were true or false. Aristotle, does nothing to show that it would not have some
distinct  valuable  role  within  rhetoric  along  these  lines.  This  argument  at
1355a24-29 is confined to showing that such knowledge of the truth would not
assist the speaker in the process of convincing some popular audiences.
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Aristotle in this way distinguishes his understanding of rhetoric from that of the
handbook  writers,  Gorgias  and  Thrasymachus,  on  the  one  hand,  and  from
Platonic views of rhetoric on the other. He offers arguments for the superiority
of his own preferred view, and I have sought to trace how he intends these
arguments to work.
Conclusion
I  have  argued  that  in  the  Rhetoric,  Aristotle  understands  rhetoric  to  be  an
expertise in helping listeners to well-deliberated judgements by making the case
for some particular view of the matter.  Of the various skills  concerned with
public speaking, it is this expertise, Aristotle contends, that is of greatest value,
whether  considered  from the  point  of  view of  the  state,  the  listener  or  the
speaker.  This  sets  his  agenda  for  the  treatise  as  a  whole.  He  sees  that  an
expertise in helping listeners to well-deliberated judgements will be essentially
an expertise in providing them with “proofs”, proper grounds for conviction,
and he sets out to offer a systematic account of what that skill / expertise is, and
how to acquire it.
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